Organizations generally depend on Google OAuth to authenticate customers. They have a tendency to imagine that Google is omnipotent and sensible, so its verdict on whether or not to grant entry to a person is taken as learn.
Alas, such blind religion is harmful: the “Sign up with Google” possibility is severely flawed. In December 2023, researcher Dylan Ayrey at Truffle Safety found a quite nasty vulnerability in Google OAuth that enables staff to retain entry to company assets after parting firm with their employer. There are additionally methods for a complete stranger to use this bug and achieve entry.
What’s improper with Google OAuth sign-in
The vulnerability exists attributable to numerous elements. First: Google permits customers to create Google accounts utilizing any e-mail — not simply Gmail. To check in to an organization’s Google Workspace, e-mail addresses with the area title of the corporate are generally used. For example, an worker of the hypothetical firm Instance Inc. may need the e-mail deal with alanna@instance.com.

Google OAuth is utilized by varied work platforms in lots of organizations. For instance, right here’s the “Signal In with Google” button on slack.slack.com
Second: Google (together with numerous different on-line providers) helps what is called sub-addressing. This allows you to create alias addresses by appending a plus signal (+) to an present mail deal with, adopted by no matter you want. One use for this might be for managing e-mail flows.
For instance, when registering an account with a web based financial institution, one may specify the deal with alanna+financial institution@instance.com; when registering with a communication service supplier — alanna+telco@instance.com. Formally, these are totally different addresses, however emails will arrive in the identical mailbox — alanna@instance.com. And since the contents of the “To:” area differ, incoming messages may be dealt with in a different way with the usage of sure guidelines.
Third: in lots of work platforms resembling Zoom and Slack, authorization via the “Signal In with Google” button makes use of the area of the e-mail deal with specified when registering the Google account. So, in our instance, to connect with Instance Inc.’s workspace instance.slack.com, you want an @instance.com deal with.
Lastly, fourth: it’s attainable to edit the e-mail deal with in a Google account. Right here, sub-addressing may be employed by altering, say, alanna@instance.com to alanna+no matter@instance.com. That performed, a brand new Google account may be registered with the deal with alanna@instance.com.
This ends in two totally different Google accounts that can be utilized to check in to Instance Inc.’s work platforms (like Slack and Zoom) via Google OAuth. The issue is that the second deal with stays invisible to the company Google Workspace administrator, in order that they’re unable to delete or disable this account. Thus, a laid-off worker may nonetheless have entry to company assets.
Exploiting the Google OAuth vulnerability and gaining entry with out preliminary entry
How possible is all this in apply? Completely. Ayrey examined the opportunity of exploiting the vulnerability in Google OAuth in his personal firm’s Slack and Zoom, and located that it’s certainly attainable to create such phantom accounts. Non-expert, common customers may benefit from it too: no particular knowhow or expertise are wanted.

An instance of exploiting the vulnerability in Google OAuth to grant Slack entry to an account registered to an e-mail sub-address. Supply
Notice that, apart from Slack and Zoom, this vulnerability impacts dozens of lesser-known company instruments that use Google OAuth authentication.
In some circumstances, attackers can achieve entry to a company’s cloud instruments even when they didn’t initially have entry to the company e-mail of the goal firm. The Zendesk ticketing system, for instance, can be utilized for this function.
The concept is that the service permits submitting requests through e-mail. An e-mail deal with with the corporate area is created for the request, and the request creator (that’s, anybody) is ready to view the contents of all correspondence associated to this request. It seems that it’s attainable for a person to register a Google account with this deal with and, via the request, get an e-mail with a affirmation hyperlink. They’ll then efficiently exploit the vulnerability in Google OAuth to check in to the goal firm’s Zoom and Slack with out having preliminary entry to its assets.
The right way to defend towards the Google OAuth vulnerability
The researcher notified Google concerning the vulnerability a number of months in the past via its bug bounty program; the corporate acknowledged it as a difficulty (albeit of low precedence and severity) and even paid out a reward (of $1337). Ayrey moreover reported the issue to some on-line providers, together with Slack.
Nonetheless, nobody is dashing to repair the vulnerability, so safety towards it appears to be on the shoulders of firm staff who administer work platforms. Fortuitously, most often, this poses no specific downside: it suffices to disable the “Signal In with Google” possibility.
And, naturally, it’s a good suggestion to protect towards attainable penetration deeper into the group’s info infrastructure via platforms like Slack, which suggests monitoring what’s happening in stated infrastructure. If your organization’s info safety division lacks the assets or experience for this, deploy an exterior service resembling Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response.