The Russian flag flies over Kyiv as Russian troops and tanks parade by means of Ukrainian cities. In Moscow, Putin basks within the glow of a brief, victorious struggle during which a Russian juggernaut crushed Ukraine in a matter of days.
Or at the very least that was the expectation conveyed by pre-war US wargames that simulated a Russian invasion of Jap Europe. Probably the most well-known was a 2016 RAND Corp. tabletop sport that analyzed a Russian invasion of the Baltic States — and during which Russian forces reached the capital cities of Riga and Tallinn in 60 hours, regardless of intervention by NATO forces.
However that tabletop Russian military belongs to a universe not our personal, in comparison with the true one in Ukraine. Two years after its tanks confidently rolled throughout the border, Russia continues to be slowed down in Ukraine, stricken by poor planning, clumsy ways and insufficient logistics. As an alternative of a rapier, the Russian struggle machine has confirmed to be a ponderous, blunt stick that depends on huge numbers fairly than talent to defeat a smaller opponent.
Why had been these wargames so flawed?
That was the query requested by RAND. The suppose tank convened an inside workshop to evaluate why its wargames had so overestimated Russian navy prowess. Researchers examined seven wargames, or collection of video games, performed from 2015 to 2021. Most of them examined a Russian invasion of the Baltic States (one additionally coated a Ukraine invasion), and the way NATO may reply. In these video games, Russian forces had been capable of shortly overrun Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania earlier than NATO may cease them. If Russia may try this within the Baltics, could not it do the identical in Ukraine?
But a fundamental flaw in these video games was merely to imagine that any Russian invasion can be deliberate and executed competently. “The sport situations and the fight strengths and different capabilities assigned to items and formations assumed that the Russian aggression can be effectively resourced, intelligently organized, and competently executed on the operational stage inside the bounds of identified or projected Russian navy doctrine and capabilities,” in accordance with the RAND report.
The Russian navy’s rollout in Ukraine was a parade of errors. Armored columns outran their provide trains. They superior in packed columns down slim roads, the place they had been decimated by Ukrainian ambushes, anti-tank missiles and artillery.
One other drawback was the wargames solely targeted on the primary couple of weeks of a Russian invasion of the Baltics. This made the sport brief sufficient for busy generals and civilian decision-makers to take part, however it additionally meant that the simulated struggle was too brief for Russian logistical deficiencies to grow to be obvious, as they did in Ukraine.
Morale is among the many most troublesome areas to incorporate in any simulation: as a result of assessments are subjective, whose military is braver and extra motivated is all the time gas for arguments. However absent the morale issue, wargames are inclined to favor whichever aspect has essentially the most and largest weapons. Morale wasn’t factored into the RAND video games, although it has turned to be an enormous obstacle to Russian operations in Ukraine, the place sullen conscripts and pardoned criminals are used as cannon fodder.
“Partly due to the brief struggle focus of the video games, the morale of Russian forces was anticipated to be adequate for items to have the ability to proceed combating till they’d suffered heavy losses, so attrition was assessed on the idea of bodily harm to programs,” RAND stated.
“We gave a tactical competence to the Russians that was in all probability overdone,” Gian Gentile, a retired US Military colonel who co-authored the RAND examine, informed Enterprise Insider. “We did not drill into sustainment like we must always have. We did not actually look arduous at command and management.”
In concept, Russia might need had extra success with a Baltic invasion than a Ukraine assault. The terrain is extra open, and Russia would have loved far larger numerical superiority over the small Baltic militaries (Estonia has simply 7,000 active-duty personnel, whereas Ukraine’s pre-war power was round 300,000). But the RAND examine factors to sloppy Russian logistics in Ukraine as proof that even a Baltic marketing campaign would have run out of fuel. “It raises questions on how possible sustaining a blitzkrieg advance to the Baltic capitals, together with defending traces of provide and communication by means of occupied territory, would have been even with a sounder invasion plan and extra diligent preparation.”
What’s troubling is how carefully the pre-war RAND video games matched the flawed assessments of many Western consultants, who claimed the Russian navy had jettisoned its Soviet-era baggage and reworked right into a extra agile and high-tech power. And which will have been the overarching drawback with these wargames: they mirror-imaged Western and Russian navy capabilities. Or put one other manner, these simulated Russian armies fought the best way that the US Military would have, fairly than the shambling and confused power that invaded Ukraine with expectations of simple victory.
Which may be as a lot function as bug. The video games “deliberately targeted on the issue of defending in opposition to a well-equipped and competent attacker pursuing a fairly wise navy technique,” the report famous. There may be logic to that method. Protection wargaming is a software, a low-cost manner for militaries to check theories and keep away from expensive errors by experimenting on the tabletop or pc, fairly than on the battlefield. If the aim is merely to determine weaknesses in NATO’s capability to help the Baltic States in opposition to Russian assault, then assuming the enemy is wise and succesful isn’t a foul concept. Ultimately, it is higher to be overprepared than overconfident.
Gentile believes RAND’s video games did accurately assess Russian air and naval energy, which have proved lower than spectacular in Ukraine. “I feel we performed accurately how their air power and navy would carry out,” Gentile stated. “It isn’t like we turned them into 20-foot-high giants.”
“I feel the essential factor that we bought proper was that if Russia needed to assault Latvia in 2020, and it was prepared to place up with all of the reactions that will have come about, then it may have reached the Baltic Sea.”
Ultimately, the lingering query is whether or not these video games had been interpreted the flawed manner, and handled as predictors of what Russia was actually able to. Exaggerating enemy energy could also be high quality for a sport supposed to investigate your defenses. However not for debating insurance policies, reminiscent of whether or not to ship help to a nation that you simply count on might be shortly defeated.
Michael Peck is a protection author whose work has appeared in Forbes, Protection Information, International Coverage journal, and different publications. He holds a grasp’s in political science. Observe him on Twitter and LinkedIn.
