Authored by Dexter Shin
Many authorities businesses present their companies on-line for the comfort of their residents. Additionally, if this service might be supplied by a cellular app, it might be very handy and accessible. However what occurs when malware pretends to be these companies?
McAfee Cell Analysis Crew discovered an InfoStealer Android malware pretending to be a authorities company service in Bahrain. This malware pretends to be the official app of Bahrain and advertises that customers can renew or apply for driver’s licenses, visas, and ID playing cards on cellular. Customers who’re deceived by commercials that they’re obtainable on cellular shall be supplied with the mandatory private data for these companies certainly. They attain customers in varied methods, together with Fb and SMS messages. Customers who should not accustomed to these assaults simply make the error of sending private data.
Detailed pretended app
In Bahrain, there’s a authorities company referred to as the Labour Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA). This company operates with full monetary and administrative independence beneath the steering of a board of administrators chaired by the Minister of Labour. They supply quite a lot of cellular companies, and most apps present just one service per app. Nonetheless, this pretend app promotes offering multiple service.

Determine 1. Official official LMRA web site

Determine 2. Pretend app named LMRA
Excluding essentially the most steadily discovered pretend apps pretending LMRA, there are numerous pretend apps included Financial institution of Bahrain and Kuwait (BBK), BenefitPay, a fintech firm in Bahrain, and even apps pretending to be associated to Bitcoin or loans. These apps use the identical methods because the LMRA pretend apps to steal private data.

Determine 3. Numerous pretend apps utilizing the identical methods
From the kind of app that this malware pretends, we will guess that the aim is monetary fraud to make use of the private data it has stolen. Furthermore, somebody has been affected by this marketing campaign as proven within the image under.

Determine 4. Victims of monetary fraud (Supply: Reddit)
Distribution methodology
They distribute these apps utilizing Fb pages and SMS messages. Fb pages are pretend and malware creator is continually creating new pages. These pages direct customers to phishing websites, both WordPress weblog websites or customized websites designed to obtain apps.

Determine 5. Fb profile and web page with a hyperlink to the phishing website

Determine 6. One of many phishing websites designed to obtain app
Within the case of SMS, social engineering messages are despatched to trick customers into clicking a hyperlink in order that they really feel the necessity to urgently affirm.

Determine 7. Phishing message utilizing SMS (Supply: Reddit)
What they need
When the consumer launches the app, the app exhibits a big respectable icon for customers to be mistaken. And it asks for the CPR and telephone quantity. The CPR quantity is an unique 9-digit identifier given to every resident in Bahrain. There’s a “Confirm” button, however it’s merely a button to ship data to the C2 server. If customers enter their data, it goes on to the following display with out verification. This step simply shops the data for the following step.

Determine 8. The primary display (left) and subsequent display of a pretend app (proper)
There are numerous menus, however they’re all linked to the identical URL. The parameter worth is the CPR and telephone numbers enter by the consumer on the primary display.

Determine 9. All menus are linked to the identical URL
The final web page asks for the consumer’s full identify, e mail, and date of delivery. After inputting every little thing and clicking the “Ship” button, all data inputted to this point shall be despatched to the malware creator’s c2 server.

Determine 10. All information despatched to C2 server
After sending, it exhibits a completion web page to trick the consumer. It exhibits a message saying you’ll obtain an e mail inside 24 hours. However it’s only a counter that decreases routinely. So, it does nothing after 24 hours. In different phrases, whereas customers are ready for the affirmation e mail for twenty-four hours, cybercriminals will exploit the stolen data to steal victims’ monetary belongings.

Determine 11. Completion web page to trick customers
As well as, they’ve a payload for stealing SMS. This app has a receiver that works when SMS is obtained. In order quickly as SMS comes, it sends an SMS message to the C2 server with out notifying the consumer.

Determine 12. Payload for stealing SMS
Dynamic loading of phishing websites through Firebase
We confirmed that there are two forms of these apps. There’s a sort that implements a customized C2 server and receives information instantly by internet API, and one other sort is an app that makes use of Firebase. Firebase is a backend service platform supplied by Google. Amongst many companies, Firestore can retailer information as a database. This malware makes use of Firestore. As a result of it’s a respectable service supplied by Google, it’s tough to detect as a malicious URL.
For apps that use Firebase, dynamically load phishing URLs saved in Firestore. Subsequently, even when a phishing website is blocked, it’s potential to reply rapidly to take care of already put in victims by altering the URL saved in Firestore.

Determine 13. Dynamically loading phishing website loaded in webview
We reported the Firebase URLs associated to this risk to Google they usually took immediate enforcement motion on them so they aren’t obtainable anymore.
Conclusion
In response to our detection telemetry information, there are 62 customers have already used this app in Bahrain. Nonetheless, since this information is a quantity on the time of writing, this quantity is predicted to proceed to extend, contemplating that new Fb pages are nonetheless being actively created.
Current malware tends to focus on particular nations or customers fairly than widespread assaults. These assaults could also be tough for common customers to differentiate as a result of malware precisely makes use of the components wanted by customers dwelling in a particular nation. So we advocate customers set up safe software program to guard their units. Additionally, customers are inspired to obtain and use apps from official app shops like Google Play Retailer or Apple AppStore. When you can’t discover an app in these shops, you need to obtain the app supplied on the official web site.
McAfee Cell Safety already detects this risk as Android/InfoStealer. For extra data, go to McAfee Cell Safety.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
Samples:
| SHA256 | Bundle Identify | App Identify |
| 6f6d86e60814ad7c86949b7b5c212b83ab0c4da65f0a105693c48d9b5798136c | com.ariashirazi.instabrowser | LMRA |
| 5574c98c9df202ec7799c3feb87c374310fa49a99838e68eb43f5c08ca08392d | com.npra.bahrain.5 | LMRA Bahrain |
| b7424354c356561811e6af9d8f4f4e5b0bf6dfe8ad9d57f4c4e13b6c4eaccafb | com.npra.bahrain.5 | LMRA Bahrain |
| f9bdeca0e2057b0e334c849ff918bdbe49abd1056a285fed1239c9948040496a | com.lmra.9.lmranine | LMRA |
| bf22b5dfc369758b655dda8ae5d642c205bb192bbcc3a03ce654e6977e6df730 | com.stich.inches | Visa Replace |
| 8c8ffc01e6466a3e02a4842053aa872119adf8d48fd9acd686213e158a8377ba | com.ariashirazi.instabrowser | EasyLoan |
| 164fafa8a48575973eee3a33ee9434ea07bd48e18aa360a979cc7fb16a0da819 | com.ariashirazi.instabrowser | BTC Flasher |
| 94959b8c811fdcfae7c40778811a2fcc4c84fbdb8cde483abd1af9431fc84b44 | com.ariashirazi.instabrowser | BenefitPay |
| d4d0b7660e90be081979bfbc27bbf70d182ff1accd829300255cae0cb10fe546 | com.lymors.lulumoney | BBK Mortgage App |
Domains:
- https[://]lmraa.com
- https[://]lmjbfv.website
- https[://]dbjiud.website
- https[://]a.jobshuntt.com
- https[://]store.wecarerelief.ca
Firebase (for C2):
- https[://]npra-5.firebaseio.com
- https[://]lmra9-38b17.firebaseio.com
- https[://]practice-8e048.firebaseio.com


